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THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER-The Distinction between its Interpretation and its Amendment: (With the Administration of the Pennsylvania Public
Utility Law used as an Example).
By
ANDREW W. GREEN*

The administrative order is the basic medium through which the quasi-judicial
administrative body exercises its power. In every instance where it is sought to control the actions of men by written law, the correct interpretation of words will
frequently become a matter of controversy.
Often, however, the administrative order cannot be reasonably interpreted to
serve the interests of one or more of the various parties affected by it. In this
situation, the adversely affected parties will desire that the order be amended. (The
word amendment in this note includes Rescission and revocation.)
The distinction between interpretation and amendment of administrative orders
is not always clear. It is the purpose of this note to illuminate this distinction by a
discussion of the problem as it arises in the administration of the Pennsylvania
Public Utility Law.
The Pennsylvania Public Utility Law 1 provides for separate proceedings to
raise the issue of interpretation of Commission orders, on the one hand, and their
amendment, on the other hand. Whether an order of the Commission has been
violated (and this necessarily involves the question of interpretation) is determined
under the provision of section 1001 of the Public Utility Law, which reads as
follows:
"Section 1001. Complaints-The commission, or any person, corporation, or municipal corporation having an interest in the subject matter,
or any public utility concerned, may complain in writing, setting forth
any act or thing done or omitted to be done by any public utility in violation, or claimed violation, of any law which the commission has jurisdiction to administer, or of any regulation or order of the commission. Any
public utility, or other person, or corporation, subject to this act, likewise
may complain of any regulation or order of the commission, which the
complainant is or has been required by the commission to observe or carry
into effect.
"The commission, by regulation, may prescribe the form of complaints
filed under this section.Section 1007 of the Public Utility Law empowers the Commission to amend
its orders; the text of this section follows:
"Section 1007. Amendment and Rescission of Orders.-The commission
may, at any time, after notice and after opportunity to be heard as provid1 Act of 1935 P.L. 1053, as amended.
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ed in the case of complaints, rescind or amend any order made by it. Any
order rescinding or amending a prior order shall, when served upon the
person, corporation, or municipal corporation affected, and after notice
thereof is given to the other parties to the proceedings, have the same
effect as is herein provided for original orders; but no such orders shall
affect the legality or validity of any acts done by such person, corporation, or muncipial corporation before service by registered mail upon such
person, corporation or municipal corporation of the notice of such
change."
Amendment
Under the practice of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, the proceeding to amend an order of the Commission is usually denominated a "Rule to Show
Cause Why the Order Should Not Be Amended, Etc." If a private party seeks this
remedy, he files a "Petition for a Rule," etc. Upon occasion the Commission has exercised this power in the form of a complaint.2 Sometimes the Commission has
combined the two proceedings in a single action, entitled a "Rule to Show Cause
Why the Certificate of Public Convenience Issued to Respondent Should Not Be
Revoked and/or Other Penalties Invoked." This type of combined proceeding is
illustrated by the recently reported cases of Rule against Robertson;8 Rule against
Ruettger;4 and Rule against Nowalk,6 wherein the Commission threatened revocation of an order granting a certificate of public convenience because of repeated
violations of the certificate, but concluded these proceedings by the imposition of
fines without revocation of the certificates.
The powers of the Commission under Section 1007 of the Public Utility Law
are very much like that of a court in op'ening judgment, and have been so compared
by President Judge Orlady in Diehl v. Public Service Commission,6 only the
Commission's powers are broader in that it may modify its orders to carry out policy,
and not merely upon the showing of injustice to the petitioner. The Superior Court
permitted the Commission to remove a restriction from a certificate of public convenience without additional evidence but merely because the Commission had
changed its mind on policy, where both the restriction or the omission of it from
the certificate were apparently to the mind of the court within reasonable administrative discretion.7 But this does not mean that an administrative tribunal can or does
act arbitrarily, for its policies must be guided by the statutory standards laid down by
the legislature and it must appear from the facts of the case, that the order of the
Commission is in accord with these standards. See Public Utility Commission v.
Lancaster Transportation Company8 for an interesting if complex discussion on
2 Public Utility Commission v. Magyan, 26 Pa. PUC 382 (1947).
8 28 Pa. PUC 162 (1949).
4 28 Pa. PUC 165 (1949).

6
6
7
8

28 Pa. PUC 67 (1949).
69 Pa. Super. 419, 421 (1918).
Arrow Carrier Corporation v.Public Service Commission, 120 Pa. Super. 570, 182 A. 711 (1836).
(1951).
A.2d 169 Pa. Super. 284, -
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how general orders of the Commission do not avoid the requirement of supporting
evidence, if this 'evidence required for the support of the Commission's acts. Thus
the Superior Court would not permit the Commission to approve the interchange
operation of two carriers where there was no evidence that this was required by
public necessity. See 28 PUC 492 (1950) for the Commission's order on a prioi
complaint in this matter. In this case it is to be noted that the Court did not criticize
the procedure of the Commission but its interpretation of its orders. The Court
said at page 294: "The Commission has given too broad a meaning to "local area"
cf Class B carriers."
The Commission has held that an order may be reopened to give a hearing
:o a party who did not have notice of the proceeding leading up to the order;9 or to
revoke a certificate of public convenience where a certificate of public convenience
was erroneously issued to a non-existent partnership. 10 The power of the Commission to rescind an order granting a certificate of public convenience to a taxi operator because of continued violations of Commission orders was sustained by both the
Superior and the Supreme Courts in Day v. Public Service Commission." And
finally the Commission will not consider a petition for rescission of its order invoking its power under Section 1007 of the Public Utility Law where the petitioner
has lost the right of rehearing or appeal by unexcused delay. 12 Nor does the Commission consider it sufficient fraud on a protestant where the protestant withdraws
his protest to an application in reliance upon an oral stipulation of the applicant, to
justify reconsideration (i. e. amendment) of the rights granted to applicant. 3
We will now consider whether a Commission order which has issued without
adequate and competent supporting evidence, and which has been perfected by
the passage of the prescribed time for appeal or rehearing, requires an amending
order to remove its effectiveness.
The Superior Court has said that an order of the Public Utility Commission
"will not be disturbed if based upon competent and relevant evidence unless it is
so capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable as to amount to error of law or a violation
of constitutional rights.' '14 Similar language can be found in the opinions of the
Superior Court in the cases of Beaver Valley Service Co. v. Public Utility Com17
16
mission15 and Collins v. Public Service Commission. But in a later decision,
9 Application of Toomey, 27 Pa. PUC 594 (1949).
10 Petition of Bruno, 26 Pa. PUC 747 (1948).
11 107 Pa. Super. 461, 164 A. 65 (1935); and on appeal: 312 Pa. 381, 167 A. 565. See
also: Diehl v.P.S.C., supra, and P.U.C. v.Bryn Athyn Supply Company, 23 Pa. P.U.C. 232 (1941)
on this point.
12 Application of Union Transfer Affiliated Co., 22 Pa. PUC 244 (1941).
13 Application of Fegley, 28 Pa. PUC 389 (1950).
14 Benkart v. P.U.C., 137 Pa. Super. 13, 7 A.2d 588.
15 122 Pa. Super. 221 223; 186 A. 304.
16 84 Pa. Super. 58, 64.
17 Leamon Transportation Corporation v. Public Service Commission, 153 Pa. Super. 303, 308, 33
A.2d 721.
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the Superior Court phrased the rule in the negative form, which has broader implications; there the court said:
"The order to this extent is gratuitous and must be regarded as capricious or arbitrary since evidence to support it is lacking."
The Public Utility Commission, relying on the Leaman case, supra, likewise
stated the rule in the negative form in its order in the case of Application of Sangui-

gni:1 8

"The Commission had no authority to issue a certificate for the transportation of general property since neither the application nor the proofs
comprehended such grant."

Despite the implications in these latter two cases that an order without sufficient
supporting evidence is void, this writer believes that the proper interpretation ot
these decisions is that all orders issued by an administrative tribunal must be presumed to be supported by sufficient evidence, and as such are merely voidable.
In brief, an order of an administrative tribunal cannot be collaterally attacked
on the ground of insufficient evidence, but must be directly attacked through a
proceeding to amend the order because it lacks sufficient competent supporting
evidence.
The case of Armour TransportationCorporatianv. Public Utility Commission'8
states clearly that an administrative tribunal cannot make an order in any proceeding in which the parties thereto did not have notice at the pleading stage of the
"issues raised." Now if the purpose of a proceeding is to amend a Commission order,
notice should be given to the respondent that one of the remedies sought against
the respondent therein is the amendment of a particular Commission order. And
of course, one of the ways in which notice of the "issue" of amendment can be
given would be to bring the proceeding in a form appropriate for amendment,
namely a Petition for a Rule to Show Cause under section 1007 of the Public
Utility Law.
But in a recent unreported order, the Public Utility Commission has indicated
that it will not insist upon such a remedy being sought in this form, and that it will
entertain the question of amendment in a complaint proceeding. In its order in
the case of Heilman v. Grimm20 the respondent sought to have the complaint dis.
missed because"the question of the validity of the authority granted by (the) Commission is improperly raised in a complaint proceeding.
In reply the Commission said:
"In regard to the Complainant's contention of mistake in the order of
April 13, 1937, while a more proper way to raise the issue of mistake is by
a rule to show cause invoking the Commission's powers in Section 1007,
of the Public Utility Law, nevertheless, since in the instant case the record
18 25 Pa. PUC 535 539.
19 138 Pa. Super. 243, 10 A.2d 86 (1939).
20 C-14761, (January 3, 1951).
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fully covers the issue, and no party would be prejudiced by the Commission's consideration of the issue of mistake, we will consider it accordingly."
Although it thus appears that the Commission may amend its order in a complaint proceeding, the question remains whether this would be proper if the parties
did not have notice either by the pleadings, or by full and fair treatment of the
issue at the hearing stage.
In this regard, the Commission's order in the Application of Sanguigni2' is ot
interest, for the Commission took care to point out that its order therein "did
not change or alter the certificate in any way," when, as the proceeding was before
the Commission on a Rule to Show Cause, the respondent may have been put on
notice that the Commission would consider, among other things, the question ot
amendment of the certificate of public convenience. But the reasons cited by the
Commission in its Rule were "violations," so that it may be said the questions of
amendment on grounds of policy or evidence were not among the "issues raised.
Interpretation
Although this writer has not found any support in the reported decisions ot
the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, or in Pennsylvania Court opinions, this
writer maintains that the parol evidence rule applies to the interpretation of administrative orders. The parol evidence rule as applied to administrative orders
means that administrative orders are to be interpreted from the language of the
order without the aid of reference to any other document or evidence, except for
well-recognized exceptions to the parol evidence rule, among the most notable
being ambiguity and special usage of the words in the field of regulation. The administrative body, being a part of the state, is especially bound by the rule of good
faith, and thus it should abide by the strict letter of its word without equivocation.
A result of applying the parol evidence rule to administrative orders is that
the administrative body should not re-examine the evidence which is the basis of the
administrative order in arriving at an interpretation of the order, unless permitted
by the recognized exceptions of the parol evidence rule. If this were not so, and the
administrative tribunal could go rummaging through its files for material in support of its desires, a most unfortunate situation would be created whereby a party
would be unable to consider and refute the contentions by which the administrative
body supported its desires.
Also the reconsideration of evidence would violate the principle of administrative res adjudicata.The testimony and arguments should be considered merged in
the administrative order.
In the opinion of this writer the reconsideration of the evidence supporting
an administrative order, as an aid in its interpretation, would violate the rule laid
21 26 Pa. PUC 404 (1947).
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down by the Superior Court in Armour Transportation Company v. Public Utility
Commission2 2 in that complaints brought by the Commission under Section 1001
of the Public Utility Law must give "a specific designation of the issue raised or
charges made" in the complaint itself so that the respondent may prepare himself
for the hearing.
In practice, however, counsel do not concern themselves in the conduct of the
hearing involving the interpretation of a Commission order as to what prior supporting evidence may be considered by the Commission, for almost invariably counsel will move to incorporate into the record by reference the testimony of all prior
proceedings before the Commission which might be remotely connected with the
controversy in the hope that the Commission will consider this testimony in the
making of its decision.
It may be noted that the Commission has ruled that it may lay down general
interpretations of its orders to determine whether violations have been committed
and is not restricted to determining whether this or that act complained of is a violation of the order. Of course, such a procedure could be abused so that orders could
be amended under the pretense of "interpretation," but no such instance appears
in the reported decisions of the Commission. In the Application of Sanguigni"
the respondent urged that the Commission improperly laid down in its prior order
reported at 25 Pa. PUC 535 (1946), the following general interpretation of its
certificate of public convenience:
"he (the respondent) must understand, however, that his right to transport, under this certificate, is restricted to such property as requires trucks,
or trailers of special design, such as winch trucks, reach or pole trailers,
and low-bed carryalls."
The respondent contended the Commission should have confined itself to:
"An investigation of the specific transportation movements described
therein for the purpose of determining if said transportation movements
constitute a violation of your petition-er's certificate of public convenience, and * * * the imposition of such penalties as the Commission may
prescribe."
To this contention, the Commission replied:
"It would be manifestly impossible to make such a determination without interprteting the certificate of public convenience. * * * The order did
not change or alter the certificate in any way." (Italics added.)
An important distinction between a complaint under Section 1001 of the
Public Utility Law and a rule under Section 1007 thereof, is that a complaint, filed
under Section 1001 of the Public Utility Law, like the initial pleading in an action
22 138 Pa. Super. 243, 10 A.2d 86 (1939). See also: Ryan v. P.U.C., 143 Pa. Super. 517; 17 A.2d
637 (1941).

28 26 Pa. PUC 404 (1947).
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at law, invokes the jurisdiction of the Commission in such a way that the Commission cannot evade the hearing of the case. But the grant of a rule to show cause by
the Commission under Section 1007, being analagous to a motion to open judgment,
as vie noted, is a matter of favor and cannot be commanded from the Commission
as a matter of right.
Conclusion
The issue ultimately is one of whether there is notice and hearing of the issues
which the administrative tribunal purports to adjudge. Such notice may be given
either by th'e form of the proceeding, or by the "theory of the case" from facts
set forth in the pleadings. In the early history of the law the "form" of action was
the means by which the parties were notified of the issues to be raised against them,
but of late, the trend in the law has been to consider it sufficient if the notice of
the facts which support the desired remedy are brought to the attention of the adverse party. Of course "fact" pleading, as opposed to "form" pleading, places a
greater burden on the defense attorney, for not only must the defense attorney
apprise himself of the facts, but in addition he must infer all the remedies which
such facts might sustain, and be prepared to defend against all of them.
Although there is much to be said on behalf of "form" pleading, it appears
more and more that the trend is towards "fact" or "notice" pleading, and the recent proceedings before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission seem to be
indicative of this tendency in our jurisprudence. Under the influence of such a trend
(or perhaps even necessity) in our jurisprudence, it seems that it is futile for the attorney in the long run to insist on the logical nicety of distinctions between "equitable" and "legal" proceedings and to insist upon their separation procedurally.
The evil against which the attorney must protect his client, and which the administrative tribunal must restrain itself from perpetrating, is the consideration
by administrative tribunals of facts or issues not placed before them, or facts not
relevant to the issues placed before them.

